Abstract-This paper deals with a decentralized faulttolerant control methodology based on an Active Fault Diagnosis approach. The proposed technique addresses the important problem of monitoring interconnected Large-Scale Systems (LSS). The fault diagnosis approach is made of a passive set-based fault detection method and an active fault isolation technique, able to guarantee isolability subject to local input and state constraints. The proposed scheme can be implemented locally in a decentralized way. A significant feature is the decentralized design constructed on tube-based Model Predictive Control to possibly allow the disconnection of faulty subsystems or the reconfiguration of local controllers. The Active Fault Diagnosis tool is designed to support the decisionmaking process for the control and monitoring of the LSS.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the problem of monitoring Large-Scale Systems has attracted increasing interest in academia and industry. Some distributed architectures have been developed for distributed Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) (see as example [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] ). These works rely on passive FDI methods, in which the status of healthy of the system is analyzed by comparing input-output data for the closed-loop system with a process model or historical data. One of the issues when dealing with passive FDI approaches is that the feedback controller may hide the presence of faults by compensating their effects (see as example [6] ) and making fault detection and isolation more difficult or even impossible. Instead, active FDI approaches consist in suitably modifying the control input to improve fault detectability and isolability capabilities [7] , [8] , [9] . However, one of the limitations of these approaches is the possibly high computational cost and complexity [10] that has prevented their use in the context of LSS systems. In order to overcome this issue, in this paper we propose a decentralized architecture, where a linear LSS composed of a (possibly large) number interconnected subsystems is considered and each subsystem is monitored by a local fault diagnoser (see [3] ), implementing a passive set-based fault detection method and an active fault isolation This work has been conducted as part of the research project Stability and Control of Power Networks with Energy Storage (STABLE-NET) which is funded by the RCUK Energy Programme (contract no: EP/L014343/1 approach, guaranteeing isolability subject to local input and state constraints. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first time that an Active Fault Diagnosis approach is proposed in a decentralized architecture for the monitoring of LSS. Moreover, a decentralized active Fault Tolerant Control (FTC) scheme is proposed where -in healthy modes of behavior -the subsystems are robustly controlled by a decentralized tube-based Model Predictive Control (MPC) (similarly as in [11] ) and monitored by a setbased passive fault detection method. After fault detection, the Active Fault Isolation tool supports the decision-making process. The goals are, if feasible, the isolation of the fault and the reconfiguration of the local controllers according to the new identified dynamics. We take advantage of the decentralized design of the local controllers to possibly allow the disconnection of faulty subsystems when the local control reconfiguration is not feasible.
In the literature, FTC methods are classified as either active or passive [12] . Passive FTC refers to the design of controllers that are robust to potential faults without modification, while active FTC schemes modify the control law in response to a fault [13] , [14] , [15] , requiring therefore methods for the detection and isolation of the faults. These methods typically assume that the faults are detected and isolated correctly and instantaneously, or that the faults occur in the absence of disturbances and measurement noise so that FDI is fast and accurate. These assumptions do not hold in real systems and delays and errors in FDI can lead to problems such as instability, violation of state constraints, and the inability to implement the suitable controller after isolation [16] . These issues can be mitigated by the use of active FDI methods. The use of such methods in the context of active FTC has been limited to the centralized case [10] , [17] , [18] . As far as the distributed/decentralized case is concerned, the contributions about fault-tolerant schemes are more recent, but either they assume to know the FDI results as given correct elements (see [19] , [20] as examples) or they use passive techniques, as in [6] , where a distributed passive FDI is integrated with distributed MPC in a PnP scenario for nonlinear systems. On the other hand, the main contribution of the paper is a decentralized active FTC scheme using Active Fault Isolation, for the monitoring and control of interconnected subsystems.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a discrete-time affine large scale system composed of N subsystems. Each subsystem obeys one of n m i possible dynamics (all known and observable). When model The proposed decentralized architecture. The subsystems are physically interconnected. Each subsystem is controlled by a local controller C i and monitored by a local diagnoser D i , both taking measurements from the local subsystems. After fault detection, the Active fault isolation tool may compute an input control sequences to allow the isolation of the fault.
. . , N} is governed by the following set of equations
where x i (k) ∈ R n x i accounts for the coupling with neighbouring subsystems and the presence of process noise d i (k). The set of neighbours to subsystem i is defined as N
, where this latter represents the dynamic matrix of the overall system. It is assumed that (A
The objective of this work is to provide a decentralized FTC scheme which benefits of an active fault diagnosis strategy. Each subsystem is governed by a local controller and monitored by a local fault diagnoser, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . Each subsystem is governed by a model predictive controller, subject to local input and state constraints, i.e.
, are all zero-centered zonotopes (see §III) known a priori. In order to guarantee robust stability and constraint satisfaction for the overall system, the local controllers are designed according to [21] (summarized in §IV). For each i ∈ N , we assume m i = 1 represents the nominal dynamics, while the other models describe possible faulty dynamics. The local control laws are synthesized off-line for every model m i ∈ M i . Each subsystem is monitored in healthy conditions by a passive set-based fault detection method. When a fault is detected in a local subsystem at time k d , the related controller is put in stand-by and a local active FDI procedure initiated ( §V-B). Active FDI aims to determine which dynamics subsystem i is subject to, by injecting a minimally harmful (in length and/or norm) sequence
) able to guarantee that any possible state (or state sequence) of subsystem i at time k d + T i is consistent with only one m i ∈ M i . In order to not spoil the stability properties of the overall system, such procedure is performed while guaranteeing that the local subsystem evolves within its state bounds X i , regardless of the active fault mode m i . It is assumed that the diagnosis is fast enough to avoid the switching between models during
Moreover, we assume that there are no faults occurring in parallel on multiple subsystems, i.e. faults affect only one subsystem at a time. Once the fault is isolated, the local controller is reconfigured in order to still guarantee the stability and constraint satisfaction of the overall system.
III. NOTATION AND BASIC DEFINITIONS
A tilde is used to indicate sequences associated with (1)-(2). When referring toũ i(l:k) ,w i(l:k) , the notation stands
The notationσ (l:k|l) indicates that the sequence is computed at time l. For each subsystem i, the state of model m i , k-steps ahead, is given by the function φ
the state solution map. The notationW {k} =W×. . .×W is used to indicate the k-th cartesian product of a set W . Zonotopes are centrally symmetric convex polytopes. Denoting with G=[g 1 . . . g n g ] ∈ R n×n g the generator matrix and with c ∈ R n the zonotope center, the set can be expressed as Z={Gξ +c: ξ ∞ ≤1}, and compactly indicated as Z={G,c}. The order of a zonotope is defined as n g /n. Zonotopes complexity (which depends on the number of generators) can be reduced by outer approximating zonotopes using sets with less generators [22] . Given an initial condition x
i{k−k 0 } } When clear from the context, the arguments of sets and maps will be omitted. Thanks to zonotope properties (5)- (7) in [23] , by iterating the state dynamics (1), one obtains suitable matricesB
Note thatũ i(k 0 :k|k 0 ) affects only the center of these sets.
IV. DECENTRALIZED MPC
The proposed FTC method assumes that each subsystem is equipped with a tube-based robust MPC controller which is designed, for each i ∈ N , m i ∈ M i , according to [21] . The approach is briefly recalled in the following.
In a decentralized tube-based robust MPC approach, the control action for each i ∈ N is given by the sum of two terms: (i) a nominal input, obtained by solving, at each k, an optimal control problem subject to the nominal model
and (ii) a linear feedback term designed to track the prediction of this nominal model. These terms are here described in reverse order. (3) with nominal input u i (k), and the real state x
This error obeys the dynamics
Thanks to the stability of A
and the boundedness of W
and w
is a robust positively invariant set and can be computed as described in [24] . We select E 
, obtained by solving the finite horizon optimal control problem (FHOCP) below for system (3)
and the terminal penalty P ∈ R n u i ×n x i are computed in order to satisfy the usual stability conditions for (3) (Assumptions 2 and 3 in [25] ). The problem above is required to satisfy the tightened constraints U
are non-empty. In order this to hold, the effect of the process noise and the coupling between subsystems is required to be sufficiently small. LetF
denote the set of initial conditionsx
for which the problem above is feasible. Let F :k+N−1) ), the tube-based MPC feedback law κ
i (k)) (5) Finally, the following theorem summarizes the properties of the robust MPC scheme above.
Theorem 1: Assume that x
, ∀k ∈ N and that no faults have occurred in the LSS. Then the system (1) in closed loop with κ
The result follows from [21] .
N . The decentralized tube based MPC summarized above guarantees the robust stability of set E [m] and constraint satisfaction for the overall system: if
V. ROBUST FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
This section presents the FDI procedures used in the proposed FTC approach. In the time interval [0, k d ], the nominal model m i = 1 is believed to be active and u i (k) is determined using K [1] i . At the same time, passive fault detection is done using a set-based approach as described in §V-A. After fault detection, in the interval [k d , k is ], active fault isolation is carried out, as described in §V-B.
A. Passive Fault Detection
According to the tube based MPC approach described above, if e 
then, the nominal model m i = 1 is not consistent with the behaviour of the subsystem, i.e. a fault has occurred in subsystem i. While this approach allows to detect the presence of a fault, due to the presence of w
the passive isolation of the malfunction could be challenging. For this reason, in the following, we suggest to use a decentralized version of the active FDI scheme proposed in [8] .
B. Active Fault Isolation
Suppose condition (6) is verified at time k d , indicating that a fault occurred at some k f with 0 ≤ k f < k d . Assume no further faults occur in the LSS between k f and the time k is at which isolation is completed. Moreover, assume that, for the system which is affected by a fault, the state dynamics stays within bounds between k f and k d . At k d , the active model m i is unknown except that m i = 1.
Denote withx i (k d ) the state value at time k d (the superscript argument is omitted, since, at this stage, the nature of the fault is unknown). Define M + i ≡ M i \{1}. The objective of decentralized active fault isolation is to isolate the local malfunction by driving the system to a state condition which can be explained by one faulty model only. In other words, given x
, and all α i = β i with α i , β i ∈ M + i . This corresponds to verifying the separation of the state reachable sets at time
0 for all the possible faulty dynamics M + i (assuming that M i is exhaustive). For ease of reading, in the following, the dependence of the reachable sets on W
will be omitted. In order to obtain the minimally harmful (in terms of length/norm) input sequence guaranteeing diagnosis we solve
subj. to dynamics (1) − (2) (8)
with increasing T i = 1, · · · until the problem becomes feasible or a T max is attained.
Similarly, for each i ∈ M + i , the constraint (12) ensures that, at the end of the isolation horizon, x
As shown in §IV, the satisfaction of this constraint ensures that the controller κ
can be feasibly implemented at time k d + T i for any possible fault m i ∈ M + . According to [8] , the problem above can be reformulated as a mixed-integer quadratic program (MIQP) which can be solved using, e.g. CPLEX [26] .
Remark 2: Note that, the satisfaction of constraint (12) may be difficult in general. However, if problem (7) is not feasible, we can still unplug the subsystem where the fault was detected and still preserve the overall stability (see §VI). (7), into subsystem i, fault isolation is obtained in at most T i steps by verifying which reachable set X
Finally, by injectingũ
the real x i (k d + T i ) belongs to. Since the problem above guarantees the isolability for all the possible realizations ofw
i , it is possible to obtain an earlier isolation, i.e. at time k < k d + T i x i (k) is already consistent with one model m i only. Note that, rather than applying the entire sequenceũ i(
it is possible to apply the Active FDI approach above in a closed-loop fashion by re-solving problem (7) at each time step with the newly available state [27] .
VI. FTC STRATEGY
In this section we detail how we can use the tools we have introduced in the previous sections for the proposed FTC strategy. At time k = 0, the nominal model m = 1 is active. During healthy nominal behaviour, before fault detection, each subsystem is controlled by the decentralized tube-based MPC introduced in §IV and monitored by the passive fault detection method in §V-A. At time k f , a single fault occurs in subsystem i and is detected at time k d > k f (if the effect of the fault cannot be explained by the local uncertainties represented by w Figure 2 . Scenario 1. There exists a control input sequence so that Problem (7) is feasible, i.e. i) it is possible to separate the reachable sets of the different faulty dynamics (achieving therefore fault isolation) ii) the state after fault isolation is guaranteed to remain in the domain of attraction, making feasible the reconfiguration of the i-th local controller designed as in §IV for the identified model m i = 1. More specifically, applying the input computed by the Active Fault Isolation tool, the fault is isolated at most at time k d + T i , identifying which model m i ∈ M i , m i = 1 is acting in the local subsystem i. Furthermore, the computed input
. At time k d + T i , once to the novel "nominal" dynamics is isolated, its controller is implemented continuing to guarantee the stability of the LSS; it will be not necessary to disconnect the faulty subsystem or to reconfigure neighbouring subsystems, since the local controller continues to satisfy local state constraints X i and therefore the influence of the reconfigured subsystem i for the computation of W j in the neighbouring subsystems j ∈ N i remains bounded as before the local control reconfiguration of i. Scenario 2. There exists a control input sequence so that it is possible to achieve correct fault isolation, but we cannot guarantee stability properties x
at the end of the Active Fault Isolation process for some i ∈ M + . Depending on the level of criticality of the considered application, the operator/decision system can decide whether to immediately disconnect the faulty subsystem or to continue with the local fault isolation without constraint (12) in order to understand the source of the problem. Again, after fault isolation we may decide to disconnect the faulty subsystem or we can use the additional knowledge to take a decision. Scenario 3. It is not possible to find a local control input sequence so to achieve fault isolation (Problem (7) is not feasible even without constraint (12)). We can therefore decide to immediately disconnect the faulty subsystem in order to avoid or reduce the propagation of the fault effects in the network of the LSS. The unplugging of a subsystem is always possible, by implying only a contraction of the set W j in the neighboring subsystems j ∈ N i , thus not spoiling neighbouring subsystems' state constraints.
The entire procedure is repeated if and when a new fault occurs.
VII. SIMULATION EXAMPLE
In this section, we show the effectiveness of the proposed decentralized FTC architecture on a power network system, composed of 5 generation areas connected through tie-lines, as described for Scenario 2 of the Appendix in [28] . The dynamics of each area, equipped with primary control and linearized around the equilibrium value for all variables, are described by the following continuous time model
is the local state, u i = ∆P re f i is the control input of each area, and ∆P L i is the local power load and N i is the set of neighbouring areas directly connected to subsystem i through tie-lines. More specifically, the matrices of system (14) are 5 (k) centered inx [1] 5 (k), and the domain of attraction F [1] 5 , for k = 1, . . . , 5, projected on the first two components.
with the parameters and values as defined in [28] for the nominal model m i = 1. We define three faulty models for the subsystem 5:
5 = 2.95. We consider similar values for the faulty inertia constants, thus making the isolation problem even more challenging. Each subsystem is subject to constraints on the state ∆θ i and on the input ∆P re f i as defined in Appendix B of [28] . We obtain discrete-time models as in (1) by discretizing model (14) with 1 sec sampling time. We assume the process noise d i of the discretized model is bounded by a zonotope D i = {0.01I, 0}, with I the identity matrix. The matrices K
of each subsystem have been computed, for all m i ∈ M i using the PnPMPC toolbox for MatLab [29] . The goal of the control is the design of the AGC layer control in order to restore the frequency in each area next to step loads.
At time k f = 3 the inertia constant in area 5 is decreased from H 5 = 12 to H 5 = 2.5 , corresponding to a reduction of about the 80% of the inertia. From an electrical point of view, this represents that the generation area has lost some local generators. In Figure 3 , we illustrate the measurements and the tubes around the nominal state of the local subsystem 5, projected on the first two state components for k = 1, . . . , 5. It is possible to see that the state x 5 (k) is contained in the tube k = 1, . . . , 5; therefore, there is no detection before k = 6. At time k d = 6, the passive local set-based fault detection method is able to detect the fault. We can see in Figure 4 that the measurement x 5 at time 6 lies outside 1 the corresponding detection tube E [1] 5 centered inx [1] 5 (6), and therefore we have detection. We then activate the local Active Fault Isolation tool. Problem (7) was solved using CPLEX. After T i = 1 step, at time k is = 7 the computed control input u 5 (6) = 0.0767 is able to separate the reachable sets of the different dynamics and to exclude all the faults but the correct one, i.e. m 5 = 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, a novel decentralized FTC scheme has been proposed for the monitoring of interconnected subsystems, using Active Fault Isolation. After fault detection, the proposed method allows to determine whether it is possible to correctly isolate the fault in a limited number of steps and to safely reconfigure local controllers or if the disconnection of the faulty subsystem is preferable in order to reduce the propagation of the effects of the fault. As a future work, we are going to investigate a distributed architecture and the presence of measurement noise and we will provide extensive simulation analysis.
